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equitable, distribution could have been achieved by considering
the two wives as participants in separate communities and as
strangers to each other instead of forcing them to contribute to
a multi-party community as was done in the instant case.
Fred R. Godwin
FAMILY LAW -USE OF BLOOD TESTS IN ACTIONS EN DESAVEU
Plaintiff brought an action to disavow a child born to his
wife during a voluntary separation. Being unable to establish
his non-paternity by any other method, he requested that his
wife and the child be required to submit to physical examina-
tions involving blood grouping tests which could prove that he
could not possibly be the father of the child.' This motion was
denied in the lower court. On appeal, held, affirmed.2  The
Louisiana Civil Code does not authorize the action en desaveu
based on blood grouping tests. Williams v. Williams, 230 La. 1,
87 So.2d 707 (1956).
Article 184 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that "the law
considers the husband of the mother as the father of all children
conceived during the marriage." However, this presumption is
not absolute, and, in certain circumstances, the husband is al-
lowed to disprove his paternity.4 When it is clear that the child
1. For a general discussion of the use of evidence obtained through blood tests
to disprove paternity, see SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 164-289
(3d ed. 1953) ; WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 165 (3d ed. 1940).
2. For convenience of trial, this case was consolidated with another action
brought by the plaintiff against his wife for divorce on the grounds of adultery.
The court refused to grant the husband a divorce, finding that he failed to estab-
lish the adultery of the wife.
On the grounds that he did not have the authority to order anyone to submit
to a skin puncture, the trial judge refused to order the tests. Plaintiff contended
on appeal that the virtual incorporation of the Discovery Statute of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure into the Louisiana Revised Statutes beginning
13:3741 gave the court the authority to order such a test. He cited the case of
Beach v. Beach, 72 App. D.C. 318, 114 F.2d 479 (1940), which held that such
an examination involving blood grouping tests could be ordered under Rule 35(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. Rule 35(a) (1948). The
Supreme Court did not decide whether or not such a test could be ordered under
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:3783, but the case was affirmed on the theory
that, even if the evidence was obtained through the tests, a disavowal of a child
conceived during the marriage could not be based on such evidence under the
Louisiana Civil Code.
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 184 (1870).
4. For a general discussion of the action en ddaaveu, see Comment, Presump-
tion of Legitimacy and the Action en Ddsaveu, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 587
(1953) and 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 401 (1954); Guillory, The Action en
Ddaaveu, 5 TUL. L. REV. 449 (1931).
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was conceived during the marriage, 5 the Code provides for a dis-
avowal in two situations: first, when the husband can prove that
the wife committed adultery and that she concealed the birth of
the child from him,6 and second, when "the remoteness of the
husband from the wife has been such that cohabitation has been
physically impossible."'7 The Code provides no other instance in
which a child conceived during the marriage can be disowned and
even denies the husband the right to disavow by alleging his nat-
ural impotence."
There is no previous case in Louisiana in which a disavowal
was attempted through the use of evidence obtained from blood
grouping tests.9 In fact, it appears that a husband had never
before sought the disavowal of a child conceived during the mar-
riage on any evidence independent of the two instances outlined
in the Code.' 0 Dicta in several cases has indicated that these two
5. Articles 186 and 187 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 create additional
occasions when the action en d4saveu can be maintained. However, in neither
of these articles is the child presumed to have been conceived during the marriage.
Article 186 allows the husband to disavow a child born less than 180 days after
the celebration of the marriage, and Article 187 allows the action when the child
is born more than 300 days after the dissolution of the marriage or judicial sep-
aration from bed and board.
6. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 185 (1870). There has been a considerable difference
of opinion among the French commentators as to the proper interpretation of
this article. The older school interprets the article so as to require proof of
adultery as well as proof of the concealment of the birth. 2 MARCADE, EXPLICATION
DU DROIT CIVIL art. 313, § 1 (8th ed. 1886) ; 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FEANQAIS Po
812 (4th ed.). This is the view that has been taken by the Louisiana court.
See Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952) ; Lejeune v. Lejeune,
184 La. 137, 167 So. 747 (1936).
However, the more recent writers say that the husband should be able to dis-
avow by proving concealment of birth together with any other reliable evidence
that he is not the father of the child. 1 COLIN ET CAPITANT, TRAITt DE DEOIT
civIL no 904 (Juillot de la Morandiere's ed. 1953) ; 2 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 804 (2d ed. 1952). See Comment, Presumption of
Legitimacy and the Action en Ddsaveu, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 401, 409
(1954).
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 189 (1870).
8. Id. art. 185. Two theories have been advanced concerning the omission of
the husband's natural impotence from the instances in which disavowal will be
allowed. One view takes the position that at the time the Code was drafted there
was no reliable proof of impotence. The other view maintains that the omission
was intended as a punishment for the husband who enters the marriage contract
without the ability to fulfill one of the major objectives of marriage. Guillory, The
Action en Ddaaveu, 5 TuL. L. REV. 449 (1930) ; LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT
CIVIL no 367 (2d ed. 1876).
9. Evidence obtained from blood tests has been accepted in many states and
in many foreign countries. For a general survey of the use of this type of evidence,
see ScnATKIN, DisPuTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS 216 et aeq. (3d ed. 1953).
10. In Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952), the husband offered
a deposition made by his wife stating that she and her husband had never consum-
mated their marriage. It is believed that this deposition was offered to prove adul-
tery as an adjunct to concealment and was not intended to be independent grounds
for the disavowal. The court held that declarations by either or both spouses can-
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instances would be considered exclusive." In one case the court
said that "the legal presumption ... can only be rebutted in the
mode and within the time prescribed by law."'1 2 (Emphasis
added.)
In the instant case the court affirmed its previous dicta and
clearly expressed its unwillingness to permit the disavowal of a
child conceived during the marriage other than by proof of the
wife's adultery accompanied by concealment of the birth of the
child, or by proof that the remoteness of the spouses made co-
habitation physically impossible. Consequently, even if the hus-
band can clearly show that he is not the father of the child, he
will not be permitted to disavow the child conceived during the
marriage unless he can prove one of the two situations specifical-
ly prescribed by the Code. The practical effect of the decision is
that the disavowal of any child conceived during the marriage
will be extremely difficult. The "remoteness test" of Article 189
of the Louisiana Civil Code has never been met,8 and, with
transportation continually becoming more rapid, it would appear
that the requirements of this test will seldom be satisfied in the
future. Article 185 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which prescribes
the other instance in which the action en d6saveu can be main-
tained, has been given such a strict interpretation by the court
that the likelihood of the husband's disavowing a child conceived
during the marriage under this article seems equally im-
probable.' 4
Perhaps the better solution to the problem would have been
to order the wife and child to submit to the blood tests and then
to admit the evidence obtained from the tests as proof of the
not affect the legitimacy of the child. On this latter point see Tate v. Penne, 7
Mart.(N.S.) 548 (1829) ; Succession of Saloy, 44 La. Ann. 433, 10 So. 872
(1892).
11. Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952) ; Dejol v. Johnson, 12
La. Ann. 853 (1857).
12. Dejol v. Johnson, 12 La. Ann. 853, 855 (1857).
13. LA. CrVIL CODE art. 189 (1870). See Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837,
167 So. 747 (1936) ; Switzer v. Switzer, 170 La. 550, 128 So. 477 (1930). See
also Harris v. Louisiana Oil Refining Co., 127 So. 40 (La. App. 1930) ; Vernon
v. Vernon's Heirs, 6 La. Ann. 242 (1851).
14. In Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837, 167 So. 747 (1936), the court held
that disavowal under Article 185 required concealment of the pregnancy as well
as concealment of the birth. In Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952),
the wife left Louisiana and went to Kansas. The baby was born in Kansas and
the court held that there was not a concealment of the birth because the wife regis-
tered the child as the child of her husband on the public records of the State of




husband's non-paternity. 15 Such a result could have been ob-
tained through the application of an accepted theory of Code in-
terpretation offered by the plaintiff. The principle behind the
action en ddsaveu is to permit the disavowal whenever clear and
certain proof that the husband is not the father is available.16
When the Code was written, there were few ways that positive
proof that the husband was not the father could be obtained, and
the specific rules set out in the Code were necessary to prevent
the actual parent from disowning his child. But through ad-
vances in medical science, evidence of non-paternity is now avail-
able that is clearer and more accurate than the evidence provided
by either of the instances prescribed by the Code. Thus the in-
tention of the redactors to limit the disavowal of a child con-
ceived during the marriage to cases where the proof is clear
would not be altered by the admission of evidence obtained from
blood tests. In fact, the principle would be furthered by the ad-
mission of this new type of evidence which was unknown at the
time the Code was drafted.
The argument presented by the counsel for the plaintiff was
fully in accord with the theory of Code interpretation generally
accepted in France and other civilian jurisdictions ever since the
contributions of Franqois Geny.' 7 The essence of this theory is
that it is properly the function of the judge to interpret the law
in the manner in which the law probably would have been writ-
ten had the drafters had the benefit of present day knowledge
and had they contemplated present day conditions.18 Following
this approach, the French courts came to admit the possibility
of disavowal based on evidence obtained from blood grouping
tests even though the articles dealing with disavowal in the
French Civil Code are substantially similar to those contained
in the Louisiana Civil Code.' 9
The court made no mention of the plaintiff's argument in
this regard, apparently feeling that such a change would be a
15. See note 2 supra.
16. 2 TOULLIER, DROIT CIVIL FRANrVAIS no 810 (4th ed.)
17. Geny's principal work on this subject is M1tTHODE D'INTERPRtTATION ET
SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVt POsITIF (2d ed. 1932).
18. Id. at 287 et seq.
19. CODE CIVIL arts. 312-318. See the comprehensive article by Barbier, L'e,-
amen du sang et le role du judge dans les procs relatifs a la filiation, 47 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 345 (1949). The use of blood tests has now been




matter for the Legislature rather than the court.20 In any event,
it is clear that a disavowal of a child conceived during the mar-
riage must be based on one of the fact situations provided in the
Code. Therefore, evidence obtained from blood grouping tests,
or any other evidence which may prove non-paternity with equal
certainty, will be inadmissible in actions en d~saveu until the
Legislature specifically authorizes their use.
William H. Cook, Jr.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY FROM TORT
LIABILITY-THE NUISANCE EXCEPTION
Plaintiffs sued the City of New Orleans to recover damages
for the death of their four-year old son who drowned in a pool
of water which was allowed to accumulate in an area maintained
by the city as a garbage dump. Plaintiffs alleged that the de-
ceased child had been attracted to the pond by a large number
of sea gulls which constantly lined its banks. The city filed an
exception of no cause of action based on the theory that a munic-
ipality is immune from liability for damages arising ex delicto
from its exercise of a governmental function. The trial court
maintained the exception and dismissed the suit. On appeal,
held, exception overruled and case remanded. The immunity of
municipalities does not extend to cases in which an attractive
nuisance has been created or maintained by the municipality.1
Burris v. New Orleans, 86 So.2d 549 (La. App. 1956), cert. de-
nied, June 11, 1956.
At Anglo-American law, while municipalities are held liable
in damages for torts committed by their employees in the exer-
cise of "proprietary" functions, they are immune from liability
for torts committed in the exercise of "governmental" functions.2
20. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in such cases as Feazel v.
Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So.2d 119 (1952), and Lejeune v. Lejeune, 184 La. 837,
167 So. 747 (1936), it could be said that the real rationale behind the exclusion
of the blood test evidence is the desire of the court to prevent the bastardizing of
any child conceived during the marriage, despite the fact that the Code provides
for the action en ddsaveu under certain circumstances.
1. The court held that under some circumstances a pond may be an attractive
nuisance. See Saxton v. Plum Orchards, Inc., 215 La. 378, 40 So.2d 791 (1949) ;
Fincher v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 143 La. 164, 78 So. 433 (1918). See Comment,
10 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 469 (1950).
2. Wysocki v. City of Derby, 140 Conn. 173, 98 A.2d 659 (1953) ; Woodford
v. City of St. Petersburg, 84 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1955) ; Heitman v. Lake City, 225
Minn. 117, 30 N.W.2d 18 (1947) ; Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222 N.C. 340, 23
S.E.2d 42 (1942) ; Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357
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